The Next Frontier: Cyberspace in Current International Law by Espino, Adán, Jr.
Access*: Interdisciplinary Journal of Student Research and
Scholarship
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 4
2019
The Next Frontier: Cyberspace in Current
International Law
Adán Espino Jr.
University of Washington Tacoma, espinoa5@uw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/access
This Undergraduate Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Teaching and Learning Center at UW Tacoma Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Access*: Interdisciplinary Journal of Student Research and Scholarship by an authorized editor of UW Tacoma
Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Espino, Adán Jr. (2019) "The Next Frontier: Cyberspace in Current International Law," Access*: Interdisciplinary Journal of Student
Research and Scholarship: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/access/vol3/iss1/4
The Next Frontier: Cyberspace in Current International Law
Cover Page Footnote
This paper was submitted because of the inspiration my law professor from UW Tacoma, Elizabeth Bruch,
gave me during that class. I not only enjoyed the class, but was moved from your encouragement during the
writing process to submit the paper for publication. Thank you. Thank you, Adán E. Jr.







As a general overview of cyberspace’s current state within international law, The 
Next Frontier introduces readers to an evolving landscape of both international law and 
diplomacy. Cyberspace and cyberwarfare are ever more paramount to how states 
conduct relations and seek to advance their interests. Such a domain cannot be ignored 
as technology advances and its uses become increasingly widespread. As such, the 
current void of comprehensive law or regulations around such pose a strong 
disadvantage for states, especially in instances of cyberwarfare. Current international 
law can be interpreted to provide a foundation for more specific consensus to be built 
on, but little exists outside of that and especially in regard to non-hostile acts. This 
paper condenses the loose pieces of international law that exists into a general 
overview for readers. It is hoped this general overview will inspire more minds to 
develop the increasingly important field of cyber law and build upon the law that 
currently exists. 
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The Next Frontier: Cyberspace in Current International Law 
The opening of video game series, Fallout, begins with the proverbial phrase, 
“War. War never changes.'' While the philosophical interpretation for this phrase may be 
true, the literal interpretation is less so. Especially in today’s information age, this 
phrase cannot be said to be accurate. Notably, the rise of the internet has made way for 
a new frontier of both war and international diplomacy. Cyberspace, defined in this 
paper as the space operated by computational devices where data may populate or 
transfer through, has emerged as a new realm that is continually more relevant to the 
rule of international law, given its growing importance and integration into everyday 
operations of modern society.  
As such, the use of cyberspace as a domain for states to act within presents an 
array of questions, challenges, and conflicts that will have to be resolved in the future if 
the international community wishes to avoid the problems that an undefined section of 
international law may present. What are those supposed conflicts? They can range from 
questions of international humanitarian law (IHL) applications via cyberwarfare, 
questions of jurisdiction via cybercrimes, and questions of trade regulation via internet 
commerce. Wherever cyberspace may exist and however it may be used, those novel 
uses must be subject to the rule of international law to settle disputes and regulate 
behavior. If vagueness or a gray area exists, then one can be sure it will be exploited, 
whether for better or worse.  
One could argue that customary international law will erase this initial vagueness, 
by citing norms or behavior states currently engage in within cyberspace. By itself, 
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though, customary law cannot be the only basis on which international law is initially 
applied to cyberspace. Especially in regard to cyberwarfare, it is important to establish 
clear and written conventions for this emerging realm of international relations. Some 
questions that may arise are: Does a cyberattack constitute a “use of force” and is 
Article 2(4)1 of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force applicable to it? Can a 
cyberattack be considered an act of aggression, allowing the UN Security Council to 
react to said attack? Cyberspace and cyberwarfare as a concept have not existed long 
enough to have established much customary law around these questions. Maybe one 
could attempt to apply customary law to cyberwarfare in the same way it pertains to 
traditional warfare. While this would be a useful step, we are still left with a range of 
concepts that do not exist in non-cyber activities yet still need to be defined (such as 
whether a virus should be considered a weapon or a program). 
Therefore, the international community must interpret current international law 
within the context of cyberspace and attempt to resolve gaps that international law may 
not cover. This paper seeks to help in that matter. However, given the scope of 
identifying where current international law is applicable to cyberspace and where it is 
not, and where new laws must be created, this paper will narrow its focus to providing a 
general overview of the current literature’s understanding of how international law 
applies to cyberwarfare and speculate, where possible, how that framework may 
translate to cyberspace more generally.  
 
 
1 In the UN Charter, under Chapter I, Article 2, paragraph 4 states: “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
Link: http://legal.un.org/repertory/art2.shtml 
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Cyberwarfare in International Law 
 The literature has largely focused on how international law applies to 
cyberwarfare, and rightly so, given the potential catastrophes and harm unregulated 
cyberwarfare may lend itself to. In addition to the large interest in regulating armed 
conflict and the strict prohibition of the use of force according to Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, thinking about where and how cyberwarfare is applicable under current 
international law is easier than thinking of the jurisdiction international law has on virtual 
documents, for example. This is because, under international law, war has been 
discussed, debated, and regulated for centuries, which therefore has resulted in more 
clearly defined sections of international law compared to intellectual property law, trade 
law, jurisdiction, etc. More specifically, the fundamentals of the international law of war 
are well understood. And given that cyberwarfare is an emerging form of conflict, the 
initial step to understanding the fundamental concept of cyberwarfare is largely 
complete. The biggest hurdles are the definition and application of these fundamental 
understandings, which can then allow for inference in other areas. This is not to say it 
will be easy, however, as the nature of cyberwarfare lends itself to an array of 
complexities.  
Cyberwarfare is unique compared to more understood forms of warfare in that it 
largely takes place within an apparently metaphysical area. More specifically, 
cyberspace, the domain where cyberwarfare largely operates, is less tangible than 
ground or naval warfare where targets and weapons are physical. Unlike ground, water, 
or even air, the domain of cyberspace passes through all nations and cyberwarfare 
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cannot be stopped without interfering in the other uses of cyberspace. Nils Melzer, of 
the University of Zürich, states in Cyberwarfare and International Law that “Cyberspace 
not being subject to geopolitical or natural boundaries, information and electronic 
payloads are deployed instantaneously between any point of origin and any destination 
connected through the electromagnetic spectrum” (Melzer, 2011, p. 5). To access 
cyberspace, one must be connected to the “electromagnetic spectrum” as all operations 
in cyberspace are inherently linked to it. Therefore, disrupting passage through 
cyberspace means disrupting all operations in cyberspace.  
Harold Hongju Koh of Yale Law School, in a 2012 speech at the USCYBERCOM 
Inter-Agency Legal Conference discussing the roles of cyberspace in national defense, 
concurs and adds that there should be a larger priority for state sovereignty in 
cyberspace given that cyberspace itself is transnational but the means to access 
cyberspace are located in sovereign territory. Koh (2012) observes that “operations 
targeting networked information infrastructures in one country may create effects in 
another country. Whenever a state contemplates conducting activities in cyberspace, 
the sovereignty of other states needs to be considered” (p. 6), as cyberwarfare only 
becomes tangible through consequential action. 
For example, if the mainframe of the network that controls the power grid of the 
city of Seattle is infected with malware and shuts off the power grid, the attack becomes 
tangible. Unlike an incoming missile aimed at the transformers in the power grid, which 
can be stopped via surface-to-air(SAM) missiles and is usually detected long before it 
reaches the target’s airspace, one cannot detect malware until it is either attempting 
passage or harbored in a device. The device housing the malware must then be 
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destroyed or undergo a complicated and time-consuming process of cleansing the 
software. Additionally, due to its instantaneous nature, it can be ambiguous as to when 
a cyberattack officially occurs (is it upon infection or upon consequence?) or, if defined, 
does it constitute an actual attack or an act of aggression under international law? In the 
case of the incoming missile, these questions would have clear answers: the launching 
of a missile towards its lawful target would clearly be when the attack occurs and would 
be generally regarded as an act of aggression.2 
In an advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
in 1996, citing Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter (articles pertaining to allowing the 
Security Council to undertake lawful military enforcement and the right to self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs, respectively), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated 
“These provisions do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, 
regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor 
permits, the use of any specific weapon” (ICJ, 1996, p. 244). This can be interpreted 
that there is no specific weapon that defines the use of force. As such, whatever is 
currently defined as a weapon falls into a “use of force” within the terms of the UN 
Charter. While the ICJ argued for the inclusion of nuclear weapons, the opinion also 
allows for the inclusion of cyber weapons.  
Indeed, Melzer (2011) expresses that “it is relatively uncontroversial that cyber 
operations fall under the prohibition of article 2(4) of the UN Charter once their effects 
are comparable to those likely to result from kinetic, chemical, biological or nuclear 
weaponry” (p. 7). As it pertains to cyber weapons, the tangible, consequential results 
 
2 The Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research program at Harvard published the Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare for further reading. 
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from a cyberattack indicate a use of force, especially if the cyber weapon was “an 
offensive or defensive tool designed to cause death or injury to persons or the 
destruction of objects and infrastructure, irrespective of whether such destruction 
involves physical damage, functional harm, or a combination of both” (p. 7). Koh (2012) 
also expresses this view, saying, “Only a moment’s reflection makes you realize that 
this is common sense: if the physical consequences of a cyber-attack work the kind of 
physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber attack 
should equally be considered a use of force” (p. 4).  However, one may ask if 
cyberattacks or operations that do not directly or indirectly result in death, injury, or 
destruction of property still fall under prohibition under Article 2(4).  
 So-called minor acts of force, or acts that would cause an international armed 
conflict that are carried out via cyber weapons or operations (but do not directly cause 
death, injury, or destruction of property), also fall under the UN Charter, as the ICJ ruled 
in the Nicaragua Case of 1986; such minor acts can be considered uses of force under 
the UN Charter. In its judgement, the ICJ states that it “does not believe that the 
concept of ‘armed attack’ includes only acts by armed bands, where such acts occur on 
a significant scale, but also assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons 
or logistical or other support. Such assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of 
force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States” (ICJ, 
1986, p. 47). In layman's terms, simply assisting insurgents (regarding the US 
assistance of the Contras in Nicaragua), in addition to overtly fighting alongside them, 
may be regarded as a use of force.  
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According to this ruling, the ICJ interprets that armed acts or “acts by armed 
bands” are not the sole characteristics of a use of force and unarmed actions or 
hostilities may also be regarded as such. Therefore, cyberattacks or operations not 
directly resulting in death, injury, or destruction of property can still be regarded as a 
use of force. Even though this ruling was applied within the context of assistance to 
insurgency groups, this principle can still be held outside of insurgent assistance based 
on the prohibition principle of the UN Charter. That is, even though the Charter’s 
prohibition of force was not explicitly extended to many nonviolent acts (for example, 
economic coercion or political pressure), the ICJ, in its 1996 advisory opinion, also 
stated that the UN Charter generally prohibits all uses of force and threats to use force 
that have not been exempted. Specifically, “The notions of ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force 
under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of 
force itself in a given case is – illegal—for whatever reason—the threat to use such 
force will likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of a 
State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the Charter” (ICJ 
1996, p. 246), which is the prohibition principle.  
Additionally, Article 1 of the Charter expresses that the UN shall “maintain 
international peace and security, and . . . take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace”. As such, any act that would breach 
said peace or lead to an international armed conflict falls under the scope of the UN’s 
purpose, and therefore the Charter, including cyberattacks and operations that would 
breach “international peace and security” (UN Charter 1(1)). 
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In concurrence, Melzer (2011) states that “As a matter of logic, the Charter 
cannot allow that the prohibition of interstate force be circumvented by the application of 
non-violent means and methods which, for all intents and purposes, are equivalent to a 
breach of the peace between the involved states,” citing examples of disabled power 
grids of major cities, disabled systems of industrial production, and disabled air defense 
systems (p. 8). 
Thereby, we are given a basic framework for understanding the applicability of 
international law to cyber weapons, cyber operations, and cyberattacks—at least for 
that which results in consequences that breach the peace: 
● All cyber operations or cyberattacks are an “act of aggression” or a “use of 
force” if such operations and attacks result in consequences similar to 
conventional operations and attacks that do constitute as an “act of 
aggression” or a “use of force” and are thus regulated under the Charter. 
● Such operations or acts that may not constitute as an overt “act of 
aggression” or a “use of force,” but would seem to or do end up breaching 
international peace and security, as well as operations or acts that seem 
to or do start an international armed conflict, are still applicable under 
international law, specifically the UN Charter. 
● Cyber weapons are regulated and treated similarly to their conventional 
counterparts. 
 At the risk of being redundant, an even simpler way to think about it is that 
cyberwarfare, cyber operations, and cyber weapons are to be treated no differently than 
similar acts or weapons lacking the word “cyber.” Concurrently, the principles of 
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responsibility are to be used when assigning attribution to an attack or action. 
Specifically, these principles and applications only apply to state actors or non-state 
actors acting as representation, on behalf of, or under the control of a state (according 
to the fundamental definition of what is a state).  
Additionally, the law of neutrality, which establishes that states have a right to 
abstain from conflict and are thereby bound to uphold their abstention, is applicable to 
all cyber operations that may be conducted by belligerents. This can be tricky, however, 
as it is generally difficult to know where exactly a cyberattack or operation has been 
launched from. Given the transnational nature of cyberspace, it is also unlikely and 
largely unfeasible for neutral states to stop all belligerent cyber activities and the 
passage of belligerent cyber activities. Melzer (2011) reasons that neutral powers are 
exempt from regulating belligerent activity through their publicly available infrastructure 
because of the impossibility of controlling such publicly available infrastructure. Instead, 
the “rationale underlying the Hague Convention would suggest that neutral states can 
be expected to prevent belligerent states from conducting cyber hostilities from within 
their territory, but not the routing of belligerent cyber operations through their publicly 
accessible communications infrastructure” (p. 20). 
While customary law is largely absent in regards to cyberwarfare, emerging 
practices are slowly creating a foundation for customary law to take shape. That is, with 
the relative ease of carrying out cyberattacks or hostile cyber operations, the frequency 
of such acts are far from uncommon. In addition, high profile cyberattacks or hostile 
cyber operations are becoming increasingly more common and more notable, such as 
Russia’s involvement with the US presidential elections and its spread of fake news 
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stories in places such as Germany’s “Lisa” case, Sweden’s anti-NATO propaganda, and 
France’s email hacking of then-candidate Emmanuel Macron.3  
While all these examples could probably be labeled as uses of force or acts of 
aggression, the language and identification as events such of these remains nearly non-
existent. Rather, it seems that states are practicing a tit-for-tat method of dealing with 
such acts, as Western powers have used cyber operations to further their own foreign 
policy.4 At least for now, these operations on all sides have been largely information-
based and may be limiting customary law around cyberwarfare to this tit-for-tat method. 
However, this may be to avoid obvious and clearly unlawful actions that, despite 
possibly providing short-term benefit, may spur an international dilemma nobody wants 
to deal with yet. 
Cyberspace in International Law 
 International law applicable to cyberspace that is not associated with jus ad 
bellum or jus in bello (international law before and during war, respectively) 
compromises a lesser portion of the literature in regard to cyberspace but is 
nonetheless just as important. Indeed, given that there seems to be a good deal of 
understanding of international law applicable to cyberwarfare, issues not pertaining to 
such are gaining more attention. For example, how does international law apply to cyber 
trade activities? How does international law apply to cyber documents? Can data be 
property regulated under international law? Could a state exercise jurisdiction in 
 
3 The Brookings Institute has an excellent report about Russia’s cyber operations in this regard:  
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fp_20180316_future_political_warfare.pdf 
4 The Council on Foreign Relations has an article that can provide more insight into how states are 
shaping customary law in cyberspace for their interests: 
https://www.cfr.org/report/promoting-norms-cyberspace 
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cyberspace? Despite a gap in legal understanding for these questions, the principle 
understanding gained from the analysis of cyberwarfare law can help answer these 
questions. 
The Equivalency Principle and Law Applicable to E-commerce  
and Cyber Documents 
 The equivalency principle is the most fundamental of the legal principles that 
form the basis for the above three bulleted points. Specifically, this principle bridges the 
gap between the seemingly abstract operations in cyberspace and traditional 
international law, as it states that cyberspace or cyber operations are functionally 
equivalent to their non-cyber counterparts. That is, laws governing said counterparts are 
applicable to their cyber equivalents.  
An explicit mention of this principle appears in the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) 1996 measure, the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce (MLEC). This law outlines the UNCITRAL’s “functional-equivalent 
approach,” which seeks to provide “an analysis of the purposes and functions of the 
traditional paper-based requirement with a view to determining how those purposes or 
functions could be fulfilled through electronic-commerce techniques” (MLEC, 1996, p. 
20). Additionally, in 2017, the UNCITRAL enacted its Model Law on Electronic 
Transferable Records (MLETR) “to enable the use of electronic transferable records on 
the basis of their functional equivalence” (MLETR, 2017, p. 17), thereby recognizing the 
use of transferable electronic records seemingly left out in the 1996 model law. 
The two documents provide for a basis for both the use of the equivalency 
principle and the application of current international law to e-commerce and cyber 
12






documents. Some notable applications come from article 5 of the MLEC and article 7 of 
the MLETR, which respectively state that “Information shall not be denied legal effect, 
validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the form of a data message” 
and that “An electronic transferable record shall not be denied legal effect, validity or 
enforceability on the sole ground that it is in electronic form” (MLEC, 1996, p. 32; 
MLETR, 2017, p. 13). Additionally, both the MLEC and MLETR act together to indicate 
cyber documents that are functionally equivalent to paper-based documents or 
conventional processes are applicable under the same laws.  
The summation of these model laws is the effective establishment of clearer legal 
understanding for contracts between parties within the cyber realm. As contracts and 
documentation are significant elements of commerce, establishing equivalency between 
cyber and conventional documentation and information covers a large piece of e-
commerce in international law. However, both model laws fail to cover other aspects of 
e-commerce, such as sales of digital products. It is possible that these other aspects of 
e-commerce are better understood through other components of the law and are not as 
relevant under commercial law. How to enforce property rights over digital products is 
one example. 
Data as Property 
Though the equivalency principle bridges the gap between the cyber and the 
conventional, such a principle becomes useless in circumstances where it is not clear 
how the conventional and the cyber are equivalent. For instance, if data could be 
considered property, what is its equivalent? For media, connections and equivalents 
can be found as digital and film creations are not fundamentally different, at least not 
13
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legally. However, with the ease of transfer and creation—and therefore, re-creation—of 
digital content, it is possible that such a determination would complicate current legal 
understandings in property or copyright law. 
 The notion of data as property is an emerging one. So much so that there is very 
little literature discussing how data can be regarded as property. Despite property rights 
and ownership having a large role to play in trade, the UNCITRAL does not provide any 
basis for data (via cyber documents or processes in this case) to be regarded as such. 
In fact, the MLETR states that a “‘person in control’ of the electronic transferable 
record… does not imply that the person is also the rightful person in control of that 
record as this is for the substantive law to determine” (MLETR, 2017, p. 44).  
Indeed, it seems that such a decision is mostly left to individual states to decide 
for themselves whether data could be considered as property and how. Yet, conflicts 
will abound eventually, as some states will differ on when and what kind of data is 
constituted as property, as well as how to resolve property disputes between parties in 
different states with differing data property laws.  
This is already prevalent within emerging intellectual property law as states pass 
differing copyright institutions and enforcements. As it stands, data seems to be 
regarded as a form of intellectual property rather than physical property. Both in current 
laws and practice, data is treated as a medium of intellectual property, just as the paper 
used to print a book. This means that while data is not owned, access to data is, as 
seen through the distribution of digital products such as movies, video games, or 
literature. Users purchase product licensing in which the creator—assuming it has been 
copyrighted--retains intellectual property rights and merely allows someone else to 
14






access the content.5 In a similar vein, companies like Facebook and Twitter sell access 
to their users’ data, rather than the data itself.6 In both cases, a user agreement is made 
and holds the user accessing the data or content liable to respecting the copyrighted 
product by not illegally copying it.  
Such agreements are not without their problems. Digital and online enforcement 
preventing illegal distribution of products proves difficult due to online pirating, as users 
are essentially given free rein to do what they please with their purchased copies. A 
user can allow another person to use the purchased copy without legal repercussions, 
as the user has legal right to use the product. However, users are not allowed to 
duplicate their purchased copies and distribute the duplicates, either free or at cost. This 
is why giving someone a purchased video game or reselling purchased video games is 
not illegal but selling or giving away pirated copies is. Yet, it is hard to police against the 
illegal distribution because to do so would mean having to watch what happens to every 
copy sold, which is impossible. As technology and IT knowhow develops, however, it 
should become possible to construct better policing techniques.7  
Privacy concerns can arise from selling access to user data that is collected by 
companies like Facebook and Twitter, as seen with the infamous Cambridge Analytica-
Facebook scandal, in which Cambridge Analytica bought access to Facebook’s users’ 
 
5 Here is a more detailed analysis of cyberspace and intellectual property law: 
Marilyn C. Maloney - Intellectual Property in Cyberspace  
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40687783?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
6 CBS News - Facebook: Your personal info for sell 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-your-personal-info-for-sale/ 
7PC Gamer - The State of Piracy in 2016 
https://www.pcgamer.com/the-state-of-pc-piracy-in-2016/2/ 
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data and devised methods to more or less trick users to giving them more access than 
Facebook had provided to Cambridge Analytica.8  
Ownership and property claims are further complicated on streaming sites like 
YouTube or Twitch. The question becomes: who owns the content (or data) posted to 
YouTube or Twitch? Is it YouTube, or the user that posted it? Currently, this is largely 
left to the sites and companies involved, which largely allow the users to retain 
ownership over their content.9 But how would this change if data is constituted as 
property? Additionally, these questions become more complex when applied on an 
international scale because websites can be accessed anywhere they are not blocked 
(China is a notable exception as it blocks many Western sites). Thus, their data can be 
accessed nearly anywhere in the world.  
Despite the relative void in the literature about this subject, those that do seek to 
answer the question of whether data can be constituted as property provide significant 
insight and analysis as to how it could. Jeffrey Ritter and Anna Mayer of Duke Law 
School are two such individuals. In “Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for 
Moving Forward,” they explain that current scientists agree that data is not merely an 
abstract concept, but a physical thing consisting of matter (Ritter & Mayer, 2018, pgs. 
223 & 256). Many discussions about regulating data also omit regulating industrial data, 
including data produced through commerce but without personal information, such as 
data in financial services. They claim “the market confirms the wealth creation potential 
that can be extracted from industrial data . . . [which is] being realized without any 
 
8 Wikipedia - Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook%E2%80%93Cambridge_Analytica_data_scandal 
9 TubularInsights - Who Owns Your YouTube Video? 
https://tubularinsights.com/youtube-copyright-ownership/ 
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substantive legal structure in place to define the information’s ownership and attendants 
rights!” (Ritter & Mayer, 2018, p. 254).  
To help provide a framework for the legal language to constitute data as 
property, Ritter & Mayer (2018) established that: 
● Data becomes real the moment it is recorded by electronic or digital 
means (p.260). 
● To exist, data must be capable of being computationally sensed and 
logged (p. 260). 
● Ownership is attached at the point in time it is recorded, and an entity 
establishes control of the data and can reliably prove it recorded it (p. 267-
269). 
In short, Ritter and Mayer (2018) largely modified US and EU property law concepts for 
tangible items to be applicable to data and altered MELTR language to provide a 
detailed framework to constitute data as property. While Ritter and Mayer (2018) 
provided an insightful perspective on the question of data as property, the 
aforementioned challenges still present themselves. Some of these challenges could be 
resolved if data fell under current international property laws via the equivalency 
principle, but given the difficulty in preventing unlawful use of property that can so easily 
cross borders, this leaves said laws nearly moot. 
Amidst these challenges, there does exist international law for intellectual 
property and patents, in which anything granted such distinctions or privileges in host 
states can be subject to current laws as per the equivalency principle. The Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, most recently amended on 
17
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1979, is an established standard for the protection of intellectual property (or industrial 
property as it was then called) and is used by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) as law, signed by many states since its promulgation, with 
Afghanistan as the most recent signee on May 14th, 2017.  
The Paris Convention enshrined among its provisions that contracting states 
must grant the same protections to nationals from other contracting states as they do 
their own. Additionally, “the right of priority” allows applicants to apply for protection 
within a certain period of time in any of the other contracting states in addition to their 
home one. A more modern version of what was laid out in the Paris Convention can be 
found in the Patent Law Treaty of 2000, as it covers many of the same subjects. All 
other treaties or conventions established by or through the WIPO is applicable as well. 
For cyberspace law, this proves useful as once a convention has established how to 
define and regulate data or its access, data can fit into existing law, either formally or 
through customary practice. 
Jurisdiction Claims over Data or Cyberspace 
 Almost certainly, the subject that holds the greatest interest is whether states 
could make jurisdictional claims over data or cyberspace. Jurisdictional claims are 
already complicated and contentious, but this is because of the high importance of the 
subject. More specifically, how jurisdictional claims can or cannot be made will dictate 
the long-term behavior of states in regard to cyberspace, as well as their role in 
international non-war activities.  
 While not representing expressed law, a group of international lawyers and 
experts from the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence studied, 
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analyzed, and debated various applications international law has on cyberspace and 
operations to prepare a set of rules called The Tallinn Manual. The work contains 
extensive insight into how states may or may not exercise jurisdiction in cyberspace.  
 The Tallinn manual claims in Rule 8 that a state indeed may exercise both 
territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction over cyber activities. The manual elaborates 
that “in principle, cyber activities and the individuals who engage in them are subject to 
the same jurisdictional prerogatives and limitations as any other form of activity” 
(Schmitt, 2017, p. 51), which refers to the equivalency principle. The manual states that 
because territorial jurisdiction is closely linked to sovereignty, states enjoy full control 
over people, objects, and activities located in their territory (p. 52). This allows Rule 9 to 
specify that a state may exercise territorial jurisdiction over “(a) Cyberinfrastructure and 
persons engaged in Cyber activities on its territory; (b) Cyber activities originating in, or 
completed on, its territory; or (c) Cyber activities having a substantial effect in its 
territory” (Schmitt, 2017, p. 55).  
In practice, this could mean that states could exercise jurisdiction over cyber 
activities that are even minimally connected to their territory, as long as such connection 
has a substantial effect in their territory. While the manual states its experts agreed that 
activities similar to those mentioned in earlier sections of this paper or comparable are 
claimable, it is important to note that the manual also states the group was split on more 
minimally connected activities such as the passage of data through a state’s 
infrastructure (Schmitt, 2017, p. 55).  
Rules 10-14 delve into extraterritorial claims and activities. The manual largely 
invokes the equivalency principle by expressing that cyber activities and operations 
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functionally similar to those already regulated are likewise subject to those existing 
regulations, such as: jurisdiction over the overseas conduct of a state’s nationals, 
jurisdiction over foreign nationals seeking to undermine the host government, consent 
by a foreign government to the exercise of jurisdiction in its territory, and immunity of 
states or their representatives that enjoy immunity under international law. The manual 
does not explicitly mention anything about data itself, however. It can be inferred that 
territorial jurisdiction claims can be made regarding data itself if all other things cyber 
are also claimable; if they were not, there would be a serious loophole. For example, if a 
painting can be territorially claimed via intellectual property enforcement in both its 
physical and digital forms, but the physical data that compromises the digital form 
cannot be territorially claimed, then how do you enforce the claim? Not only is it 
needlessly complicated but it effectively eliminates state jurisdiction in cyberspace. 
Because of the equivalency principle this cannot be the case, hence, it can be inferred 
data itself can be claimed. Therefore, this principle is the fundamental bedrock of legal 
applicability in cyberspace. 
A more complicated facet of data claims is the extraterritorial potential. Some 
aspects can be inferred, such as gaining express permission from a foreign government 
to exercise jurisdiction over data in its territory, but many aspects of extraterritoriality 
cannot be so easily inferred. For example, without express permission, can a state 
exercise jurisdiction over data generated overseas by one of its nationals?10 As it stands 
now, the answer is speculative at best because, despite the principles laid out by the 
 










Tallinn Manual in regards to jurisdiction, such a question is subject to property law. 
Such law is not specifically covered by the Tallinn Manual, and data currently is not 
constituted as property. Another example is whether a state can claim jurisdiction over 
parts of the internet. Unlike cyberspace originating from infrastructure within a state’s 
borders, the internet is transnationally connected by every computational device that 
can access it and only exists through that connection.11 Therefore, if a state could claim 
jurisdiction over the internet, where would that jurisdiction end? It might be wise to 
conclude a state cannot claim jurisdiction over the internet for the same reasons that 
states cannot claim jurisdiction over the high seas or outer space.  
Conclusion 
 Though cyberspace and the various activities that occur within it may seem 
complex, understanding how such activities can be regulated under international law is 
paramount to the sustainability of peaceful and orderly international relations for the 
future. There are still many questions that must be answered, but thankfully a basis for 
the many facets of cyberspace and cyber operations, the equivalency principle, allows 
current and future thinkers to continue working to answer those questions.   
However, unlike other spheres regulated under international law, the domain of 
cyberspace is rapidly evolving, which means that corresponding law must rapidly adapt 
to change, despite significant unknowns. For example, in the most likely segment to 
expand—cyberwarfare—the world has yet to see true cyberwarfare waged. It would 
seem that a fully-fledged cyberwar would begin not with an open declaration or visible 
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attacks. Rather, it would take shape through subtlety and proxy, where part of the battle 
is simply figuring out who is carrying out the attack. Much like the way states wage 
proxy wars today, cyberwar will hide under the cover of more immediate or physical 
events. Rarely will these be obvious shutdowns of infrastructure or systems; they are 
more likely to be disruptions, big or small, that stack up over time or stoke fractures in a 
state. Political interference will be one front,12 while economic issues will be another.13 
At the same time, the potential for spying will be clear.14  
Jurisdictional and property issues will continually emerge with the introduction of 
new connective software and technologies. Determining how or when physical data can 
be interpreted as property may be best solved by linking said data to its intellectual 
source and relying on established and enforceable copyright law. What may remain 
truly impossible to solve are jurisdictional claims to data or to digital spaces. Maybe in 
the future there might exist technology that will allow cyberspace to manifest as a more 
tangible realm (possibly through virtual reality), which will make cyberspace easier to 
navigate. Maybe such speculation might be better left to a paper regarding 
technological advancements instead of law. Either way, the future for both fields awaits.  
Hopefully, readers will find themselves excited about this future. The unknowns 
of future development and current uncertainty are intimidating, if not downright scary. 
But readers must remember their power to shape these unknowns and uncertainties. 
 
12 Russian interference in the 2016 US Election 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-election 
13 The Council of Economic Advisers, February 2018 - The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. 
Economy 










This paper’s aim has been to provide an accessible overview of the laws that govern 
current systems and may guide future developments of new ones. Through this 
accessibility, it is hoped that readers may find themselves empowered to not merely 
continue expanding the literature, but use their knowledge to develop solutions. This 
paper has speculated on gaps in the literature at large, as well as how the space might 
develop, but there is so much more to cover.  
We are always exploring the next frontier. 
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